Definitions (Wittgenstein)

Inner-Object Model of Sensation

The view that psychological objects stand for (and thus the words we use for them refer to) objects, or states or occurrences, in a person's mind.

Ascribability Argument (definition)

If we ascribe to the Inner-Object Model of Sensation, then it is impossible to understood someone else's sensations on the model of our own. Outlined in PI 302.

Ascribability Argument (argument)

As Wittgenstein notes (in PI 302), to understand "N.N. is in pain" is to understand that N.N., the individual, is in pain. So we need to transfer our understanding of our pain to N.N., as if we were (in Wittgenstein's example) transfering our pain from our hand to arm. But, as Hume notes, we never observe a SELF feeling that pain, so the move won't work.

Beetle Argument (definition)

PI 293: A public word does not stand for (refer to) a private object.

Beetle Argument (argument), part 1

Wittgenstein begins by posing the problem of inverted sensations (I feel pain when I say "pain", but someone else feels something else).

Beetle Argument (argument), part 2 (the beetle example)

Imagine everyone has a box that only they can look into, they cannot describe what's in that box (hence making it a private box), and they all decide to call it a beetle. The actual "beetle" itself is irrelevant. All that matters is its presumed effects, but those effects are public (i.e., my beetle is boring me, my beetle is sick, etc.)

Beetle Argument (argument), part 2 (quote)

Wittgenstein writes that "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game [...] one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box."

Beetle argument (argument), part 2 ("anti-behaviorst" objection)

One might object that what is in the box DOES matter, since what is in the box will impact how the box-owner will speak, and thus the meaning of the word "beetle". This could be used as a critique of Wittgenstein's "behaviorism" (internal states don't matter, just external behavior). The reply is that Wittgenstein wouldn't deny that there is something in that box, and that the qualities of that something matters, but that those qualities only matter insofar as they change the PUBLIC meaning of the word. Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist (he does not deny the existance or importance of mental states), but he does deny that the PRIVATE content of those mental states is what words refer to.

The sensation diarist (description and problem)

Decides to call some new sensation S, and then write down S everytime he has the sensation

The sensation diarists 3 possibilities (1 of 3)

1. Just say that this is S without any further reflection. Problem: whatever will feel right is right, and that is absurd

The sensation diarists 3 possibilities (2 of 3)

Appeal to a past memory M that contains you saying S and the sensation. Then your new sensation S* is an S-sensation if it is the same. But what does same mean?

The sensation diarists 3 possibilities (2 of 3): the problem of same (2 choices)

Either:
*This new sensation is the same as the old one if they are both S-sensations. But how do you know that they are S sensations? Circular
*It is the same if it "feels" the same. But then same just equals what feels right, so there is no normativity.

The sensation diarists 3 possibilities (3 of 3)

Attach S to some external sign like blood pressure rising. But then the meaning of S - the sensation that occurs when my blood pressure rises - is public, since the sensation itself could change and we wouldn't be the wiser. (See the Beetle Argument)